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I.

INTRODUCTION

Unlike in prior years when the Supreme Court of Florida was active in
the juvenile law area, this year, there is not much to report from the high
court with two exceptions. On the other hand, the intermediate appellate
courts and the Second District Court of Appeal, in particular, continue to be
active in several respects. They continue to provide guidance with statutory
interpretation of Chapters 39 and 985 as well as to reverse when trial courts
make clear mistakes regarding evidentiary matters.
II.

DEPENDENCY

Domestic violence has been the subject of dependency proceedings in
the Florida courts for a number of years. Chapter 39 specifically recognizes
domestic violence as grounds for dependency describing it as harm that can
take place when a person "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a
wanton disregard for the presence of a child and [can] reasonably result in
serious injury to the child."' However, domestic violence is limited in a dependency proceeding by the proposition that the harm that takes place must
occur in the presence of the child.2 The child must see the violence and be

* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. This article
covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008.
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(32)(i) (2008).
2. D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
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aware of it. 3 The proof may be more than the child's presence when the domestic violence occurs.4 Finally, the violence must result in some mental,
physical, or sexual injury to the child5 or "prospective abuse" that is imminent.6
In the second domestic violence situation, the test is whether, when the
parents' behavior occurs, it must be shown that there is a "nexus" between
that behavior and the State's assertion of prospective abuse as to the children.7 These issues came up in a pair of cases involving the same family in
the Second District Court of Appeal in L.R. v. Department of Children &9
Family Services 8 and J.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services.
One of these reported cases involved the father' ° and the other involved the
mother." In each case, the appellate court found that the Department of
Children and Families (DCF) did not introduce any evidence that either parent engaged in domestic violence after the children were born. 12 In fact, all
of the domestic violence occurred years before the dependency trial took
place.13 Thus, the court found, as to the father, that the findings were speculative and unsupported.' 4 As to the mother, the DCF alleged, inter alia, that
the mother placed the children "at substantial risk of imminent abuse" because she failed to protect them from an abuser even where the child was not
previously abused.' 5 Starting with the proposition that there was not evidence that any of the children had been injured in any way, the court held
that, nonetheless, there was no nexus shown between the parents' behavior
and prospective abuse.' 6 It held that, in failure to protect situations, there are
3. D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 615, 617-18 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
4. See R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 834 So. 2d 415, 416-17 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); D.H., 769 So. 2d at 427; D.D., 773 So. 2d at 617-18.
5. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2); see also M.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.
2d 709, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); A.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 876 So.
2d 647, 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); D.D., 773 So. 2d at 617-18.
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f).
7. N.D. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
8. 947 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
9. 947 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
10. Id. at 1247.
11. Id. at 1247; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1242-43.
12. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1247; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1244.
13. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1248; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1243-44.
14. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1250.
15. L.R., 947 So. 2d at 1244-45.
16. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1250; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1245.
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two nexuses that must be proven-the acts of the abuser shows that he or she
will continue the abuse and "the parent's behavior shows that he or she will
continue [to fail] to protect
the child." 17 Under the facts of the case, neither
18
of these was proven.
Finally, in the case involving the mother, the court ruled on an evidentiary matter worth expressing. 19 The DCF had offered documents in evidence alleging violence after the children's birth. 20 It was the father's written petition seeking a domestic violence injunction against the mother in
which he alleged, by checking a box, that the incidence took place in the
presence of the children. 21 At trial, he testified that he checked the box inadvertently. 22 The trial court found his explanation not credible. 23 The appellate court found the document was hearsay and, while there is an exception
to hearsay "if the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and 'the statement is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony [at trial,] and was given under oath.., at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding or in a deposition,"' it may be used. 24 However, the written
statement 25here was not made in a matter described in the Florida Rules of
Evidence.
The limitation on domestic violence being grounds for dependency,
even in the presence of a child, was also before an appellate court in J.S. v.
Department of Children & Families.6 In that case, there was an incident
which "occurred when the child was only a few weeks old. 27 The mother
"'raised her hand' to the father during an argument. The father twisted her
arm, took the child from the mother's other arm, and left the residence with
the child. 28 The appellate court held that while there was an acrimonious
relationship between the parents, they were now separated and there was no
evidence that the child was affected by the incident of domestic violence.29

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

LR., 947 So. 2d at 1245.
Id.
See id. at 1244.
See id.
Id.
LR., 947 So. 2d at 1244.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id.
977 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla.5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 707.
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The 30appellate court thus, reversed the finding of dependency as to the father.
In a third domestic violence dependency case, M.B. v. Department of
Children & Family Services,31 the Second District Court of Appeal was faced
with a situation where there was a single incident of domestic violence in the
presence of the children, but where there was no evidence that the children
suffered any physical or mental harm as a result of witnessing the act or that
the parents posed any current threat of harm to the children.32 Under the
facts of the case, "the [f]ather knocked the [m]other down several times,
punched her in the chest, and kicked at her legs" after learning that she "was
cheating on him., 33 The young children were in the room and witnessed the
events.34 At the dependency hearing, the mother testified that the father had
never hit her before during their eight-year relationship, and did not touch
her since.35 Subsequently, the father and mother ended their relationship and
were currently involved in other relationships and there was no evidence that
the father had engaged in any inappropriate harm toward the children.36
Thus, there being no evidence that the safety and well-being of the children
would be threatened if they were placed in their father's care, there was insufficient evidence to make a finding of dependency.37
In M.B., the Second District Court of Appeal ruled in a domestic violence dependency case interpreting what it means for the domestic violence
to occur in the presence of the child.38 It held that the "'presence' of the
child must be something more than physical proximity. '39 There must be
"evidence that the child sees or is aware of the" occurrence of the domestic
violence. 4° Thereafter, there must be a showing of "some physical, mental or
sexual injury to the child" and that the parent's harmful behavior must
present a present risk to the child based upon current circumstances.4' Under

30. Id.
31. 937 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
32. Id. at 712.
33. Id. at710.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. M.B., 937 So. 2d at 710.
37. Id. at 711.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. M.B., 937 So. 2d at 711 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d
1273, 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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the facts of the case there simply was no evidence that the child was aware of
the violence that occurred.
The nexus test described previously in the context of domestic violence
dependency cases can also arise in other factual scenarios. For example, in
G.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services,4 3 both parents appealed
from an adjudication of dependency as to a daughter, and the mother appealed as to the daughter and her two sons by her former husband who was
not a party to the proceeding." The underlying facts of the case are significant. The parents took a three year old son of the mother to the hospital after
the father, who had noticed that the child "had wet his pants, . . . lifted the
child... off the bed [and] swung him around, [and as he did so] heard a loud
pop.''45 At the hospital, it was determined that the child had suffered a spiral
fracture of his left arm and the matter was reported to the DCF. 46 As a result,
the child who was injured and his sibling, and the couple's daughter, who
was born after the incident, were sheltered. 47 The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed as to the daughter and the uninjured son finding that the
evidence was not legally sufficient to support the finding that the mother
failed to protect the daughter or the other children from the father's abuse,
and that DCF "failed to establish a nexus between the [flather's abuse of [the
stepchild] and prospective abuse [of his daughter]". 48 The test for whether
the mother, as the initially non-offending party, may be held accountable in
dependency is that the parent must have allegedly failed to protect the child
in that the parent "knew or should have known" that the abusive parent was
engaging in the abuse.49 DCF conceded that there was no evidence that the
mother knew or should have known that the father constituted a danger to the
baby daughter and that the mother failed to protect their baby daughter.5 °
Similarly, "there was no evidence that the [m]other knew or should have
known [that] the [f]ather had a propensity toward abuse" as there had been
no prior incident. 51 Thus, there could be no showing that the mother failed to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
937 So. 2d 1257 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 1259.
Id.

Id.
47. Id.
48. G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1263.
49. Id. at 1262-63; see also A.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 901 So. 2d 324,
327 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); A.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 876 So. 2d 647,
648 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
50. See G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1262.
51. Id.
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protect the child who was injured by her father. 52 And finally, there must be
a nexus between abuse and the prospective abuse to the sibling. 53 None of
this applied to the mother but as to the father, there was just a single incident
of abuse.54 There was "no evidence [of] any psychological condition" of the
father that might indicate ongoing abuse. 5 And "there was no evidence of
any other incident[] of abuse to any of the children., 56 Thus, there was no
nexus between the abuse of the one child and the others.57 The appellate
court, therefore, reversed the adjudicatory disposition as to the father and the
young daughter and as to the mother, as to all three children.5 8
A second case involving a dependency proceeding charging domestic
violence and the issue of presence of children in order to substantiate the
charge is M.M. v. Department of Children & Families.5 9 In this case, DCF
alleged that the mother was not willing or able to protect the child because
she "failed to follow through with a restraining order against the father after.
. . two incidents of domestic violence against" the mother.6" The father had
been arrested twice but the mother refused to testify at trial. 61 There was
also an additional incident where the father broke into the mother's home,"
was drunk, and the mother sought and obtained a temporary restraining order. 62 None of these incidents occurred in the presence of the child. 63 Be-

cause the trial court's judgment established that the dependency proceeding
was based solely on the "domestic acts involving violence, or the threat of
violence committed outside ...

the presence of the child," and because the

undisputed testimony by the mother that she "prevented the father from having any contact with" the child in the two situations, and there was no evidence that the mother's "failure to extend the restraining order constitute[d]
imminent harm to" the child, the court reversed.'
It is possible to prove dependency based upon acts of domestic violence
that occur outside the presence of the children. As described earlier in this
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1262-63 (citing C.M. v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 844 So. 2d 765,
766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
54. Id. at 1263.
55. G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1263.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 946 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1289.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. M.M., 946 So. 2d at 1290.
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survey, it can be done if there is a showing that the acts of domestic violence
create an imminent risk of harm to the children. In C.J. v. Department of
Children & Families,65 the issue was whether incidents of domestic violence
can rise to the level of a risk of imminent neglect of the child.66 In that case,
"[t]he first incident resulted in the mother seeking a restraining order; the
second involved cuts and bruises and the mother being hospitalized; and the
third incident involved ... [the husband] grabbing and holding [the mother's] sister, smashing car windows, and breaking [the] glass coffee table
[with all of] the children in the same or adjacent rooms. 67 The mother suffered serious injuries and the sister called the police.68 The court concluded
that the finding of dependency was proper in that there were "multiple incidents of ongoing and substantial domestic violence with [the] children
present" at the house in a short period of time which created "a risk of imminent neglect." 69
However, there has to be competent evidence of the domestic violence
as defined by Florida law. 70 Under the facts of the case, in T.S. v. Department of Children & Families,7 ' involving claims of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, the appellate court held that the mother's "two applications for domestic violence injunctions" did not result in the issuance of a
restraining order and the other incident in which the father and mother were
involved in a commotion at the mother's house in which the father was combative when the police arrived and threw a chair which hit the door of the
house, did not constitute legally sufficient demonstration of domestic violence.72 The appellate court thus reversed.73
As the Second District Court of Appeal said in M.C. v. Department of
Children & Family Services,74 the law relating "to prospective harm to one
child by a parent based upon" the abuse and neglect or abandonment as to
another is well-settled.75 In In Re M.F.,76 the Supreme Court of Florida had
65.

968 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

66. Id. at 122.
67. Id. at 124.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 125.
70. See FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (2008) ("'Domestic violence' means any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated
stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any [other] criminal offense resulting in physical
injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.").
71. 944 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 1050-52.
73. Id. at 1049.
74. 936 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
75. Id. at 765.
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originally required that the evidence necessary to prove dependency as to
other children required more than a finding as to a child against whom injury
had occurred." The court required additional proof establishing a nexus between the prior abuse and the prospective abuse of the sibling recognizing
that a flexible test was required. 8 The intermediate appellate courts have
further amplified the opinion by describing what the nexus requires. For
example, a parent who suffers from "a mental or emotional condition that
will continue [as in the case of] mental illness, drug [abuse], or pedophilia
[makes] it highly probable that" the parent in the future will abuse or neglect
another child. 79 The court applied these principles in M.C., where a stepfather who had abused an eleven-year old child of the mother by a previous
marriage appealed from an adjudication of a second child, his natural child
by the mother.8"
The testimony generating a nexus between the alleged offense of sexual
abuse of the other child, which was hotly contested, in M.C., was the testimony of a sexual abuse expert.8 The expert "testified that there are three
[ways] by which adults who sexually abuse a child may recidivate against
another child," but that the appellant father did not meet any of the three
"pathways" tests and that risk was not imminent to the other child.8" However, the expert was asked whether, if the court found that the first child was
a victim of sexual abuse, did the expert believe that there was "a substantial
risk that if untreated, [the father] could commit an act ... of sexual abuse
against his own child," to which the expert answered "correct. ,83 The appellate court rejected this hypothetical question and answer as the basis for the
finding of nexus.84 It did so because the Florida test for nexus is more than a
finding of a "sexual abuse of one child creat[ing] a substantial risk of abuse
to another child. 85 The fact that it arises in the context of testimony by an
expert witness does not disguise it as a per se rule rejected by the Supreme
Court of Florida.86

76.
77.
78.
79.

770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 1194.
Id.
See C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 844 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.

App. 2003).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

M.C., 936 So. 2d at 764.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 767-68.
See M.C., 936 So. 2d at 768.
Id.
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The intermediate appellate courts also decided a series of procedural issues during the past two survey years. In what can only be described as an
extraordinary failure to comply with rudimentary due process, a trial court
found a child dependent as to the mother, based upon the proffers made by
the DCF lawyer and the parent's lawyer and a short colloquy with the mother
in A.G. v. Department of Children & Families.87 At the start of an adjudicatory hearing, the mother's lawyer told the court the following: "Seriously, I
would truly be happy to have-DCF's attorney-proffer his evidence as to
what he believes makes this child dependent, and I'll proffer mine and let
you make a decision. 88 Apparently taking the lawyer at the lawyer's word,
and after addressing the mother directly and hearing her answer in which she
said that she had "'more than enough evidence to prove that"' she took care
of her son, the court found the child dependent. 89 As the appellate court
noted in reversing, "there was no evidence, no sworn testimony, and no stipulated facts presented to the trial court at [that] hearing."9 The appellate
court held that once the lawyers for the two sides had "proffered significantly
different facts which would" produce different results depending upon whose
factual assertions the court believed, "due process required the ... court to
proceed [to] an evidentiary hearing." 9'
In a second case, albeit in the adoption law setting, involving the failure
to receive evidence and move immediately to a finding, a trial court heard
opening statements in an unfitness proceeding under the state adoption law,
asked the lawyers to proffer evidence, and at the conclusion of opening
statements granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and entered final
9 the appellate court held
judgment for the respondent.92 In A.N. v. M.F.-A.,
that the dismissal of a "petition with prejudice based upon a proffer of testimony by the attorneys in their opening statements... prior to the completion
of appellants' case" was a violation of due process and thus there should be a

87. 938 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 606-07.
90. Id. at 607.
91. Id. at 607 (citing Lane v. Lane, 599 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
In addition, the appellate court then added that even if the parent's attorney had proffered facts
to demonstrate dependency, the trial court should determine whether such an "admission or
consent to a finding of dependency was made voluntarily and with a full understanding."
A.G., 938 So. 2d at 607. If the parent's lawyer proffered testimony that would constitute
grounds for dependency, the appellate court held that there would still have to be an admission
or consent of the findings by the parent. Id.
92. A.N. v. M.F.-A, 946 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
93. Id. at 58.
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reversal. 94 Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court
noted, the motion for judgment for a directed verdict must occur after the
party seeking affirmative relief has had an opportunity to present evidence. 95
The right to present evidence is also provided for earlier in a dependency proceeding, at the shelter care hearing stage.96 In L.M.C. v. Department of
Children & Families,97 the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of
the parents' "request to present evidence on the issue of probable cause" at
the shelter care hearing. 98 In a brief opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reaffirmed the proposition "that parents have a statutory right to present
evidence contesting probable cause at shelter [care] hearings. ' 99
Perhaps most disturbing among the cases reported here concerning due
process procedures is C.J. v. Department of Children & Families." In that
case, DCF alleged that the child was at a "substantial risk of imminent threat
of harm ... or imminent neglect. . . arising out of [the father's] history of
domestic violence against the mother."1 °1 DCF conceded before the appellate court "that the trial court erred in making a 'blanket ruling' admitting
hearsay under the assumption that hearsay 'is permitted in dependency matters.""0 2 Noting that the trial court has "discretion to rely upon hearsay" in
such matters as shelter hearings, at the adjudicatory stage the Florida statute
on point is crystal clear: "'[aIdjudicatory hearing[s] shall be conducted by
the judge.., applying the rules of evidence in use in civil cases.'""03 In what
can only be described as a polite understatement, the appellate court held
"[t]hus, the trial court erred in admitting, and relying upon, inadmissible
hearsay testimony at the adjudicatory hearing.""
Rights of a parent as to whom no dependency finding was made were
before the court in C.K. v. Department of Children & Families. °5 The father
appealed "from an order finding him unfit for placement of [his] minor
child" and required him to comply with requirements of the Interstate Com94. Id. at 60.
95. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b)).
96. L.M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 935 So. 2d 47, 47 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing A.M.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); S.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So. 2d 552, 552 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam)).
100. 968 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
101. Id. at 122 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30), (43) (2006)).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.507(l)(b) (2006)).
104. Id.
105. 949 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

20091

2007-2008 SURVEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW

pact on the Placement of Children. 10 6 The appellate court found that while
the trial court in a dependency case does have "authority to require a nonoffending parent to participate in treatment and services," the evidence must
be sufficient to require such obligations. °7 However, the court's order requiring the father to comply with Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children was affirmed because that statute does apply where "the court is
transferring custody of the child to an out of state non-custodial parent,"
which was the case in the matter before the appellate court in CK.108
Complying with principles of service of process in a dependency proceeding would seem simple enough. However, compliance with service
rules was before the Third District Court of Appeal in N.L. v. Department of
Children & Family Services.'0 9 Under Florida law, service of process must
be either personally on the "parent who can be located" or by a showing of
"diligent search and [an] inquiry for a parent who cannot be located."" In
N.L., "there was no personal service of the.., petition on the mother and
[there was] no affidavit of diligent search.""' Thus, there was a failure to
comply with the statute.11 2 Significantly, the appellate court rejected Department's argument "that service of the dependency petition on the mother's
counsel was effective to accomplish ... service on the mother."" 3 Further,
the fact that the summons in the dependency proceeding "contained a warning that failure to respond or appear at the hearing constitutes consent to an
adjudication" does not dispense with the obligation of the State to serve the
petition." 4 Thus, the appellate court reversed." 5
Parents have the right to counsel by statute in Florida in dependency
proceedings as well as in termination of parental rights cases." 6 In S.K. v.
Department of Children & Families,"7 a father, in prison for life, appealed
from a trial court order adjudicating his child dependent, arguing "that the
trial court" failed to provide him with "an attorney ad litem to represent him
106. Id. at 337; see FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (2008).
107. C.K, 949 So. 2d at 337 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.521(l)(b) (2006); J.P. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 855 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
108. Id. at 337-38 (citing H.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 838 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
109. 960 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
110. Id. at 812 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.502(4)-(9) (2006)).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. N.L., 960 So. 2d at 812-13.
115. Id. at 813.
116. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2008); see also L.R. v. J.F., 960 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2006)).
117. 959 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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when he was indisputably incompetent," and thus denied him due process."'
The appellate court affirmed, finding that the father was represented by
counsel through the entire proceeding and that the proceeding "could not be
delayed to await" the father's restoration of competency. 1 9 The appellate
court recognized that the trial court was faced with two propositions: First,
the protection of the child as well as the parent; and second, the obligations
of the lawyer representing a client under a disability pursuant to the Florida
Rules of ProfessionalConduct.'20
The appellate court first held that the rights of the parents "must yield to
the needs of the children."' 12 ' The court then discussed at length the obligation of counsel to a client under a disability. 22 The court recognized that
"[there is no provision in any [law] for the appointment of an attorney ad
litem for a parent" although such a provision does apply for children. 1 3 The
rationale, according to the appellate court was quite simple-"[p]arents are
already provided with attorneys."' 2 4 Further, the appellate court recognized
that the attorney ad litem for a child
performs the duty of an attorney and the
25
parent already has an attorney.1
The court then recognized that the possible remedy would have been the
"appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person, . . .even within a
dependency proceeding."'' 26 However, this did not occur in this case.'2 7 The
court thus concluded that
the parent was represented by obviously competent
28
counsel and affirmed.
Cases involving corporal punishment have regularly been reported upon
in this survey. 129 However, the law is clear that "one incident of corporal
punishment, even when [the] parent's behavior is uncontrolled, [does not

118. Id. at 1210.
119. Id.

120.

Id. at 1211-13 (quoting FLA.

BARR. PROF. CONDUCT

4-1.14).

121. Id. at 1212 (quoting L.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 946 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
122. S.K., 959 So. 2d at 1212-13.
123. Id. at 1213 (citing FLA. R.Juv. P.8.217).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. S.K., 959 So. 2d at 1213
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Michael J. Dale, 2003 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV.
543, 544 (2004)[hereinafter Dale, 2003 Survey]; Moore v.Pattin, 983 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.2008).
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suffice] to support a dependency adjudication."' 3 ° This was the issue before
the court in E.S. v. Department of Children & Families.13' The appellate
court reversed a finding of dependency based upon a single act of "inappropriate or excessively harsh corporal punishment" because there was only one
instance.132 The appellate court held that the facts did not support a finding
of dependency based upon the single act. 133 Then it added, "[h]ere, the trial
court conceded that it was not following the correct law, as it acknowledged
the case law in its tentative oral ruling, but stated that it disagreed with the
case law. ' 34
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The test for termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdictions, requires the trial court to make two findings.135 The first is to prove a
statutory ground in abuse, neglect or abandonment. 36 The second is a determination that termination is in the best interest of the child.'3 7 In KW. v.
Department of Children & Family, 38 a father whose parental rights were
terminated and who had been "convicted on nine counts of sexually abusing
his" children and his stepchildren, as well as others, and was "serving three
consecutive life sentences" appealed from the termination order.'39 He
claimed that the court failed to consider his mother who lived in Tennessee
and who indicated an interest in looking after the children for a long-term
placement, as a less restrictive means short of termination of parental
rights. 14° Florida recognizes that "[t]he least restrictive means test requires
that measures short of termination" of parental rights be undertaken "if they
would enable the child to reunite safely with the parent.'' 4 However, the
least restrictive alternative test does not apply after parental rights are termi130. E.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 984 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (citing C.C. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 556 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. FLA. STAT. § 39.802(4)(a), (c) (2008).
136. Id. §§ 39.802(4)(a), .806 (1)(b)-(c).
137. Id. § 39.802(4)(c); see I MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT,
4-103 (2008).
138. 959 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
139. Id. at402.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing L.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189, 1195-96 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
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nated as part of the "task of placing the [child] in a suitable home."' 142 The
Florida courts have held, and the court in K.W reaffirmed, that "long-term
' 43
relative placement does not foreclose a termination of parental rights."'
The obligation of the court is to determine whether termination is in the "best
interest of the child."' 44 It may take into account long-term placement with a
relative but it need not if to do so would not be in the best interest of the
child. 45 On this basis, the court in K.W.affirmed. 46
In a termination of parental rights case based upon abandonment, Florida provides the precise statutory elements which must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 47 In T.S. v. Department of Children & Families,148 the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida was faced with the application of the
abandonment grounds in the context of a parent's incarceration.1 49 The law
in Florida is clear that a parent's incarceration is a factor to be considered in
"terminating parental rights based" upon abandonment, but incarceration
alone without other evidence is insufficient grounds. 5 ° In addition, for abandonment to be shown, there must be proof that the parent was financially
able to provide for the child or assume parental obligations which may be
impossible in the context of incarceration.' 5' In the T.S. case, the father was
incarcerated for only eight months during a period when the child was between eight and fifteen months old.1 52 Further there was no evidence that the
father had the ability to either support the child or had meaningful contact
during that period. 5 3 Thus, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that
there was no substantial evidence of abandonment.154
It would seem obvious that a court may only terminate parental rights
on grounds alleged in the Department of Children and Family Services petition. Yet, in two recently reported opinions, L.A. G. v. Departmentof Child-

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
K.W., 959 So. 2d at 403.
See id. at 402.
See id.
Id. at 403.

147.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.809(1) (2008).

148. 969 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
149. See id. at 495.
150. Id. at 496 (citing W.T.J. v. E.W.R., 721 So. 2d 723, 723 (Fla. 1998); K.S. v. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 898 So. 2d 1194, 1198 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); J.T. v. Dep't
of Children & Family Servs., 819 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
151. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (2008); C.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 874 So. 2d
1246, 1248 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); J.T., 819 So. 2d at 272.
152. T.S., 969 So. 2d at 496.
153. Id.
154.

Id.
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ren & Family Services155 and Z.M. v. Departmentof Children & Family Services,156 the Third and First District Courts of Appeal of Florida, respectively, reversed the termination adjudications at the trial level on the same basis-that the trial courts terminated based upon grounds not asserted in the
petition.157 In LA.G., the court held that a "termination order violates due
process [when] it is based on grounds not asserted in [the] petition.' 58 Specifically, the failure to include the ground for termination in the petition denies the parent notice of the charges in a proceeding that will result in "the
parental death penalty," as described in the concurring opinion.' 59 In ZM., at
the close of evidence, the court suggested a ground for termination that
seemed to be more apt than that pleaded by DCF. 16° When DCF "expressly
declined to seek amendment of the petition," the trial court nonetheless ter61
pleaded nor added by amendment.
minated on grounds that were neither
162
The appellate court thus reversed.
The issue of whether a parent's failure to appear at an adjudicatory
hearing in termination of parental rights proceedings constitutes consent to
the termination has been before the Florida appellate courts on a number of
occasions over the past half-dozen years. 63 Chapter 39 of the Florida
Statutes allows termination of parental rights by consent where a parent fails
"to personally appear at" an adjudicatory hearing where the parent was
advised in person at the advisory hearing of the obligation to appear.'
However, Florida courts have been reluctant to terminate parental rights by
default where a parent "makes a reasonable effort to be present" at the
hearing but is unable to do so due to "circumstances beyond the parent's
control."'' 65 The issue came before the Second District Court of Appeal of
155.
156.
157.
158.

963 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
981 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
L.A.G., 963 So. 2d at 726; Z.M., 981 So. 2d at 1269.
L.A.G., 963 So. 2d at 726.

159.

Id. at 728 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (citing Michele R. Forte, Comment, Making the

Casefor Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 193 (2003)).
160. See Z.M., 981 So. 2d at 1269-70.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1271.
163. See Michael J. Dale, 2005-2006 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REV.
577, 597-98 (2007); Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of FloridaJuvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV.
397, 417-20 (2005) [hereinafter Dale, 2004 Survey]; Dale, 2003 Survey, supra note 129, at
554-56; Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of FloridaJuvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 1, 22-23
(2003).
164. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2008).
165. T.L.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 883 So. 2d 910, 914-15 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th
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Florida again in B.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services.1 66 In that
case, the trial court terminated a mother's parental rights to her three children
when she did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing, and her counsel advised
the court that the mother's caseworker had told the lawyer that the parent
informed the case worker that she was having transportation problems. 167
The lawyer requested a continuance and advised the trial court that he would
transport the mother to the next hearing.168 The trial court rejected the
request for continuance and terminated parental rights by consent. 69 The
appellate court concluded "that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
[the lawyer's] motion for a continuance." 70 Here, the mother could not
attend because of "transportation problems beyond her control" and there
was no evidence that she was "stalling" or disregarded the proceedings, or
that the children would in any way be harmed by granting the continuance.' 7 '
Relying upon earlier case law relating to transportation problems beyond the
72
parent's control, the appeals court reversed.
While the failure of a parent to appear can serve as the basis for
termination of parental rights, where the parent fails to appear at an advisory
hearing because the parent did not receive notice, it would seem obvious that
termination may not take place. In S.S. v. Department of Children & Family
Services, 73 the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed this
proposition stating "[b]ecause the delivery of . . . notice is an express

condition precedent to the draconian consequences of a parent's failure to
appear, it follows that, on that point alone, the termination of parental rights
in this case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.' 74
Charges of abuse and neglect and efforts to seek termination of parental
rights occasionally arise in the context of divorce cases. The Florida courts
have occasionally analyzed the interplay of the two proceedings. 175 Such
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); S.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 877 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004); G.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 857 So. 2d 310, 312 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003)).
166. 943 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 887.
171. B.B., 943 So. 2c at 887.
172. Id. at 886-87 (citing R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1213
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
173. 976 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
174. Id. at 42.
175. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV.
91, 112 (2000); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 191,208 (1995).
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was the case in S.S. v. D.L.176 Nearly five years after the couple's marriage
was dissolved, the former wife amended her "petition for dissolution to
include termination of [the father's] parental rights to his two younger
daughters." 177 At the time, the father was in prison and release was
imminent. 78 He "was convicted of sexual battery of the thirteen-year-old
friend of his eldest daughter.' ' 179 The mother had remarried, and at trial the
testimony presented came through the former wife, her new husband, and a
guardian ad litem. 8 The appellate court recognized that "termination cases
filed by divorced parents are rare" and suggested "caution to avoid second
challenges to custody determinations.' 8' The appellate court overturned the
finding of termination of parental rights on several grounds, including the
fact that the opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem was speculation since
the guardian was not an expert and, more significantly, that no nexus had
been shown between the sexual abuse conviction and the future behavior of
182
the father toward these children.
The issue of proper testimony by expert witnesses in termination of parental rights cases came before the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida in Department of Children & Family Services v. D. W.183 In that case, the
expert witness improperly supported "his opinion by testifying [about] the
contents of three articles published in the Journal of Neurosurgery."' 84 The
articles themselves, as inadmissible hearsay, should not have been relied
upon by the court.1 85 Merely because an expert relies upon a treatise does not
make it admissible. The opposing party, here the Department of Children
and Family Services, "was unable to cross-examine the authors of the articles
regarding their qualifications or any aspect of their studies."' 186 Thus, the
appellate court reversed
for a new trial on the petition to terminate parental
87
rights of the parents. 1
Apparently, the procedures for changing counsel on appeal in dependency and termination of parental rights (TPR) matters are not always followed. As a result, the Second District Court of Appeal in W.G. v. Depart176.

944 So. 2d 553 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

177.

Id. at 555.

178.
179.

Id.
Id.

180. Id. at 555-56.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

S.S., 944 So. 2d at 557.
Id. at 558-59.
946 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 622.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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ment of Children & Family Services'88 issued orders to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed upon appellate and trial counsel for failure
to notify the appellate court about substitution of counsel on appeal.'8 9 The
appellate court held that "when a trial court appoints [a lawyer] to represent a
parent in [the appellate] court in a dependency or TPR case, the trial court
should" forward a copy of the order to the appellate court. 9 ° Then, because
the trial courts may fail to carry out this responsibility, the appellate court
said that "it would be prudent for trial counsel who has been granted leave to
withdraw to [forward] copies of any trial court order[s] granting leave to
withdraw and appointing [an] appellate counsel" to the appellate court. 19'
And finally, "the attorney appointed as appellate counsel should" file notice
of appearance in a prompt manner in the appellate court and attach a copy of
the court's order of appointment. 92
IV.

PERMANENT GUARDIANSHIP

Florida law provides that when reunification with the parent "or adoption is not in the best interest of the child, the court may place the child in a
permanent guardianship with a relative or other adult [who is] approved by
the court" subject to a set of five conditions set out in the statute. 193 In C.D.
v. Department of Children & Families, 94 the question was whether the evidence at the trial level, placing the children in permanent guardianship and
denying the mother's Petition for Reunification, was supported by competent
The appellate court reversed and remanded for reunification
evidence.'
with the mother and reinstatement the Department of Children and Family
Services' supervision.' 96 The court held that a denial of reunification "based
solely on issues existing at the time a dependency case was initiated, without97
regard to the parent's progress" in overcoming the problems, is improper.
Further, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to follow the mandatory language of the state law providing the six factors that must be demonstrated in showing that reunification is not "in the child's best interests."' 98
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

944 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT.

§ 39.6221(1) (2008).

974 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 496-97.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 496, 500-01; see FLA. STAT. § 39.6221(2).
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With specific reference to the case plan, the appellate court held that two
questions must be answered: "[T]he parent's compliance with the case plan
and whether reunification would be detrimental to the children."' 99 Finding
no substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding, the
appellate court reversed. 2 °
Once a court makes a finding of permanent guardianship, it may terminate protected supervision by DCF. In LZ. v. Department of Children &
Families2 1 a mother appealed from an order terminating Department supervision and placing the child in permanent guardianship. °2 In a short opinion,
the appellate court found that "the trial court's order met the statutory requirements for terminating protective supervision and for placing the child in
a permanent guardianship" as provided by Florida law.20 3
V.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The Florida State Legislature has provided that in certain situations
criminal justice costs and surcharges can be taxed against criminal defendants. 2°4 Funds from the surcharge are used to support a variety of state and
local programs.2 5 The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida in V.K.E.
v. State,2°6 the significant juvenile delinquency case decided by the Supreme
Court during the survey period, concerned the question of whether juvenile
court judges had the authority to impose surcharges on a juvenile in a delinquency case.20 7
The underlying facts were that an eleventh grade student "was involved
in an altercation with another ... and entered a plea of nolo contendere to
[the] delinquency petition" of simple battery.20 8 It was a misdemeanor and
the Court withheld adjudication, placing the child on probation and ordering
her, inter alia, to pay domestic violence costs of $201 and rape crisis fund
fees of $151.209 Relying upon a concurring opinion by Judge Sharp in the
Fifth District Court, the Court held that the legislative intent in creating the
juvenile justice system as a separate "rehabilitative alternative to the punitive
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

C.D., 974 So. 2d at 500.
Id. at 503.
967 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427; see FLA. STAT. § 39.6221.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 938.08, .085 (2008).
See id.
934 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2006).
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1278.
Id.
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criminal justice system" did not include the assessment of costs as provided
for in the criminal justice system within the juvenile justice system 1 ° Justices Cantero and Bell dissented.1
The juvenile's right of privacy was before the First District Court in an
unusual case in A.H. v. State.212 A sixteen-year-old girl "challenge[d] her
adjudication of delinquency for producing, directing or promoting a photograph or representation that she knew included sexual conduct of a child in
violation" of Florida law. 213 According to the appellate decision, the girl and
her seventeen-year-old boyfriend were charged under the child pornography
laws for taking a substantial number of digital photos of the two of them
"naked and engaged in sexual behavior."2 4 They then emailed the photos to
another computer from the girl's house. 2' 5 The photographs were not actually distributed to any third party.1 6 The girl filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the statute as applied to her was unconstitutional as an invasion of
her right to privacy under the Florida Constitution. 217 The majority held
there was "no reasonable expectation of privacy" because these were photographs and they might be shown to others in the future.21 8 Further, the court
said the pictures taken were shared by the two minors involved in the activities.2 9 Neither juvenile, according to the majority, "had a reasonable expec22 °
tation that the other would not show the [photographs] to a third party.
Then, in a statement without attribution, the court said the following: "Minors who are involved in a sexual relationship, unlike adults who may be
involved in a mature committed relationship, have no reasonable expectation
that their relationship will continue and that the photographs will not be
shared with others intentionally or unintentionally. ' 22' Apparently, the basis
for this statement is the court's stated concern about child pornography.222
The court's attempted cause and effect analysis is hard to follow. Apparently
the court thought that the "117 sexually explicit photographs [that were tak210. Id. at 1278, 1282-83.
211. V.K.E., 934 So. 2d at 1285-93 (Cantero, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 1293-94 (Bell, J.,
dissenting).
212. 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
213. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2008)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
218. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id.
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en] would undoubtedly have market value., 223 The court's second argument
was that there was a compelling state interest in prosecuting the juvenile.224
The court held that "[t]he State's interest in protecting children from exploitation in [the] statute is the same [irrespective] of whether the person inducing the child to appear" is an adult or a child. 225 The argument is selfdefeating for at least two reasons. First, the court assumes that the child who
did not take the picture is the one to be protected.226 This apparently runs
counter to the fact that both of the juveniles were charged with acts of juvenile delinquency.227 Second, while the child who was photographed was a
boy and was older, there was no analysis of equal treatment of males and
females. 28 What is oddly missing from the majority's opinion is an analysis
of whether this was the least restrictive means available to the State in dealing with the problem of promoting sexual conduct through photographs of
minors. 229 Rather, the court seems to believe that the compelling interest was
seeing that the photographs were never produced. 230 That argument seems to
suggest that criminal penalties were in order to stop minors from "doing it
again."
The dissent in A.H. relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion
in B.B. v. State.23 ' B.B. was an opinion that overturned a statute "prohibiting
unlawful carnal intercourse" as applied to consensual behavior by minors. 32
In B.B., the act was carnal sexual intercourse and in A.H. the act was photographing sexual intercourse.2 33 According to Judge Padovano, dissenting,
this was "a distinction without a difference. 2 34 The dissent viewed the matter as one of privacy because in fact, the child intended to keep the photographs private. 35 As the dissent concluded, "I believe the court has committed a serious error. The statute at issue was designed to protect children, but
in this case the court has allowed the state to use it against a child in a way

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237.
Id. at 238.
Id. (citing State v. A.R.S., 684 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
See id. at 236-39.
Id. at 235.
See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236-39.
See id. at 237-39.
See id.
Id. at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting) (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995)).
Id.
A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239.
Id.

Id.
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that criminalizes
conduct that is protected by constitutional right of priva36

cy."

2

Issues concerning restitution in delinquency cases regularly come before the intermediate appellate courts. For example, in two short per curiam
opinions, the First District Court of Appeal in T.L. v. State237 and f.M. v. State
(LM.
I/),238 reversed a trial court that had entered a restitution order in the
absence of the juvenile appellant.239 In I.M. H,over the objection of counsel,
the appellate court heard testimony determining the amount of restitution.24
The court recognized that "[a] juvenile has a constitutional right to be present
at hearings to determine the imposition and amount of restitution [in the absence of] a voluntary intelligent waiver of [the] right." 24' The appellate court
also held that a trial court may only order restitution for an unemployed or
incarcerated delinquent child with a showing that the child has the present
ability to pay on a finding that the child had suitable employment, and the
court must also base the amount of restitution on anticipated earnings.242
In two recent cases, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with
the question of whether a trial court could go directly to a determination of
restitution without providing the delinquent with notice and a right to a separate hearing. 243 In J. G. v. State,244 at the disposition hearing, the victim's
father testified to medical bills and lost wages.245 The "court, hearing no
objection, ordered [the child] and his parents to pay" a restitution in the
amount of over $3400.246 The appellate court reversed on this ground, holding that a trial court must conduct a restitution hearing addressing the child's
ability to pay and then the amount of restitution could be paid. 247 There must
also be notice given to the juvenile that the evidence produced at the disposi-

236. Id. at 241.
237. 967 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
238. 955 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
239. See id. at 1164; T.L., 967 So. 2d at 421.
240. .M. 11, 955 So. 2d at 1164.
241. Id.; see also T.L, 967 So. 2d at 421; M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); T.A.S. v. State, 892 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
242. 1.M. 11, 955 So. 2d at 1165; see also M. W.G., 945 So. 2d at 601; A.J. v. State, 677 So.
2d 935, 938 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
243. See J.G. v. State, 978 So. 2d 270 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); L.S. v. State, 975 So.
2d 554 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
244. 978 So. 2d at 270 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
245. Id. at 272.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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tion hearing would determine the amount of restitution. 248 The court gave no
notice of either the hearing on the amount or the child's ability to pay.249
In L.S. v. State,250 the court took evidence on the amount of damage to a
vehicle in a vandalization case at the adjudicatory stage.25 ' Then, when imposing a penalty, the court held "that the child was responsible for restitution
in the amount testified by the owner., 252 The appellate court held that
"[w]hile the testimony of the owner was sufficient to prove guilt, it was not.
sufficient to [set] the amount of restitution. 25 3 Furthermore, it held that
there was no notice to the child that he would be obligated to offer evidence
as to the amount of restitution at a hearing to determine whether he was even
guilty of the charge. 54 The issue of how the amount of restitution is proven
at a restitution hearing was before the court in a similarly named case LM. v.
State (LM. 111). 25 5 A child was adjudicated delinquent for the commission of
an arson and burglary when "he and friends set fire to a middle-school band
room." 256 On remand from a prior appellate ruling,257 a school official testified that he contacted "vendors to determine the fair market value" of property including items like choir robes. 258 He determined that the value was
$31,143.259 The juvenile's lawyer objected that the testimony was based
upon hearsay. 260 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the person
testifying "did not have personal knowledge of the value of the" damaged
property "but relied upon the opinions of... vendors, who did not testify. 26'
In reversing, the court noted that written estimates might "suffice, so long as
they satisfy the requirements of business records... or are uncontested. 262
A second case involving the improper alliance on hearsay testimony in
establishing the amount of restitution is T.J.N. v. State.2 63 A juvenile appealed from an order of restitution in the amount of $1910 relating to damage
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
J.G., 978 So. 2d at 272.
975 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id.
Id.
958 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
Id.
I.M. v. State (LM. 1), 917 So. 2d 927, 935 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
LM.III, 958 So. 2d at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per

curiam).
263.

977 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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caused to "a truck in connection with the commission of two batteries. ' ' "6
The appellate court recognized that, under Florida law, a "'[w]ritten opinion[] or estimate[] may qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay
rule"' and thus, may be admissible.265 The court further noted that there is a
distinction between a witness who states from hearsay what someone else
said the damages might be and an individual who, qualified as an expert, can
opine as to the fair market value of the cost of repairs.2' In the case at bar,
an insurance adjuster testified on cross-examination that he based his testimony on an estimate received from an auto body shop.267 The respondent
objected and on appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.268
In a case involving proof of damages at the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in L.D.G. v. State,269
affirmed a trial court finding that the State provided proof of damages exceeding $1000 for purposes of establishing a prima facie showing of a felony
of the third degree under Florida law. 70 The respondent had been "accused
of damaging a vehicle in a temper tantrum" and the State, through the owner's testimony, showed that the insurance paid $750, the insured paid a deductible of $500, and the total payment was made by handing over to the
repair company the sum of $1250.271 The appellate court rejected the claim
that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and also found that the evidence
was "prima facie proof by competent, substantial evidence [of] the damage
exceed[ing] $1000.,,272
Florida has developed a body of statutory law as well as interpretative
case law concerning the standards for secure detention for delinquents. The
statutory scheme is quite clear. First, the child may be detained for the specific reasons contained in the statute.273 Second, the statute requires that, in
the absence of a specific statutory exception, the order placing a child in detention must "be based [upon] a risk assessment of the child. 274 This risk
assessment is undertaken using a standardized document known in Florida as

264.
265.

Id.
Id. at 773 & n.2 (quoting Butler v. State, 970 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.

2007)).
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 773.
Id.
T.J.N., 977 So. 2d at 773-74.
960 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 767 n.1; see also FLA. STAT. § 806.13(1) (b) (2006).
LD.G., 960 So. 2d at 767-68.
Id. at 768.

273.

FLA. STAT.

274.

FLA. STAT.

§ 985.255 (l)(a)-(j) (2008).
§ 985.245 (1) (2008).
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a "Risk Assessment Instrument." 275 A court has the power to deviate from
the level of restrictiveness required by the scoring instrument but the judge
must explain why the deviation is necessary. 6 When the court deviates, it
must provide a written statement of "clear and convincing reasons" for the
deviation. 7
Application of the Risk Assessment Instrument and the limits of statutory authority to detain a child was before the First District Court of Appeal in
K.E. v. Department of Juvenile Justice.

8

The child petitioned for a writ of

habeas corpus to challenge the validity of detention during a juvenile delinquency proceeding based upon the fact that "[t]he child had a total score of
two points on the Risk Assessment Instrument and therefore did not meet the
general [category] for detention.,, 279 Although the matter had become moot,
the appellate court, nonetheless, issued a ruling because the matter was "capable of repetition yet evading review. 2 8 0 Under the facts of the case, the
child with a "total score of two points, which [was] not enough to justify any
form of detention without a written statement of clear and convincing reasons," and who was not eligible for detention based upon a charge of domestic violence because there had been no showing that secure detention was
necessary to protect the victim, nonetheless was subjected to continued secure detention by the trial court based upon the mother's fear that the juvenile posed an ongoing threat of domestic violence even though the child was
not going to be living with the mother; and further the mother feared the
child would run away and then perhaps take drugs or engage in sexual activity.2 1 Citing in a footnote, the fact that in the last eighteen months the appellate court had issued writs of habeas corpus directed to the juvenile trial
judge, the Honorable Angela Dempsey, in fourteen juvenile delinquency
cases, including the one at bar, and in ten of which writs were issued because
the judge had "failed to give adequate reasons for departing from the risk
assessment instrument or failed to give any reason at all," the court reversed.282 In so doing, the court stated, "[t]hese errors lead us to conclude
that our main point bears repeating. Juvenile detention is a matter that is

275.
2007).
276.
277.
278.
279.

See K.E. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 963 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(b).
Id.
963 So. 2d at 865.
Id.

280. Id. at 866.
281.
282.

Id. at 867.
Id. at 867-68 n.1.
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controlled by legislation. It is not for us, as judges, to question the wisdom
283
of the legislation. Rather, our task is simply to carry it Out.
Among those requirements is that a juvenile is entitled to a detention
hearing within twenty-four hours of being taken into custody.2 8 The issue in
D.M. v. Dobuler85 was whether a judicial circuit administrative practice procedure in Miami, which did not require a detention hearing within the twenty-four hour period, violated the state statute.286 The specific issue before the
appeals court was what the term "taken into custody" meant.287 The court
held, contrary to the assertion of the State, that a child who is to be placed in
detention must receive a detention hearing within twenty-four hours of being
physically detained by law enforcement.2 88 It does not mean twenty-four
hours from the time a juvenile probation officer takes the child into custody
and determines the need for detention.2 89
The appellate courts often deal with questions of interpreting who gets
detained and for what. In ZB. v. Departmentof Juvenile Justice,29 ° the issue
was whether certain juveniles, who are alleged to be absconders from probation, could be held in secure detention.291 The definition of absconding established by the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in its Handbook was a
juvenile who was "gone in a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the
courts in order to avoid legal process" or one who would "'hide, conceal or
absent himself clandestinely with the intent to avoid legal processes. '-292
Under the facts of this case, while the juveniles may have violated curfew
conditions of probation, "they voluntarily returned to their approved residences" and thus did not meet the definition in the DJJ Handbook. 293 Therefore, because the juveniles did not meet the agency definition, they were not
considered absconders, and thus could not be securely detained pursuant to
the risk assessment instrument which forms the basis for evaluating secured
detention in Florida. 94

283.

K.E., 963 So. 2d at 868.

284.

FLA. STAT.

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

947 So. 2d 504 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 507.
Id. at 509.
See id. at 508.
938 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
See id. at 584-85.
Id. at 585.

§ 985.215(2)j) (2005).

Id.
Id. at 585-86.
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The use of curfew ordinances for juveniles has become popular in the
United States 295 and has been recently ruled on by the Supreme Court of
Florida.29 6 Violations of curfew ordinances often can result in delinquency
charges filed against juveniles. 97 Such was the case in State v. A.L.298 In
that case, a sheriffs department deputy observed "a young man, who appeared to be a juvenile, walking on a public street" in violation of the county's curfew order.299 The child consented to "a pat-down search," and the
search resulted in discovery of a bag of marijuana and a pipe. 3°° The child
moved to suppress the evidence, and the trial court rejected the claim on the
grounds that it was proper "for the deputy to suspect that [the child] was violating the curfew ordinance.""'' The appellate court, in affirming, recognized the growing body of Florida law supporting the proposition that officers may reasonably suspect that juveniles are violating curfew ordinances. °2
Juveniles have been provided the right to counsel in delinquency cases
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1967 in In re Gault. °3
The right to counsel includes the right to a conflict-free attorney who will
represent the juvenile vigorously, independently and avoid the appearance of
a conflict. 3°4 The issue of conflict-free counsel arose in A.P. v. State.30 5 A
fifteen-year-old girl was charged with battery on her stepfather. 30 6 It turned
out that the public defender representing the child was a member of an office
which had represented the victim's stepfather on a prior domestic matter
charge.30 7 The assistant public defender advised the court in the presence of
the child that he might have a conflict of interest because of the facts that he
had asserted, and then he requested what is known in Florida as a Forsett
inquiry, from the name of the case establishing the proposition.30 8 That case
allows for voluntary waiver of a conflict if three matters are "proven: 1) the
See DALE ET AL., supra note 137, at 5-13.
296. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2004).
297. See e.g., State v. A.L., 956 So. 2d 1215, 1215-16 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
298. Id. at 1215.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1216.
301. Id.
302. See A.L., 956 So. 2d at 1216 (citing C.H.S. v. State, 795 So. 2d 1087, 1091-92 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Altenbernd, J., concurring); A.J.M. v. State, 746 So. 2d 1222, 122425 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
303. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
304. See Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA. L. REV. 903, 904
(2002) (stating that juveniles have the right to "effective assistance of counsel").
305. 958 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.; see Forsett v. State, 790 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
295.

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

defendant is aware of the conflict; 2) the defendant understands that the conflict could affect [one's] defense; and 3) the trial court has informed the defendant of the right to obtain other conflict-free counsel. '' 309 The appellate
court read the transcript of the inquiry by the trial court and found that the
three elements of the test were not proven independently as to the fifteenyear-old who did in fact waive the conflict. 310 The appellate court then held
that because the assistance of counsel is an important constitutional
right, the
311
violation of the constitutional right cannot be viewed as harmless.
Issues relating to waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles come up regularly in the Florida courts and elsewhere.3 2 Included among those issues is
whether juveniles can waive Miranda rights without the presence of the parents.313 The states differ on the requirement for parental presence and possibly parental approval of the waiver.3t 4 The issue of the role of parents in the
waiver of Miranda rights was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
State v. S. V.315 The State appealed an order granting the juvenile's motion to
suppress on the grounds that the trial court granted the motion "solely on the
316
basis that the juvenile's parents were not notified before the interview.
The appellate court agreed with the State, although it affirmed the suppression on other grounds in one of the two charges involving the juvenile that
was before it.3 17 In one of the two charges, when the Miranda warnings were
given, the appellate court held that they "were defective because they failed
to advise the juvenile of his right to counsel during [the] questioning."31
However, as to the issue of the ruling that the child's statements should be
suppressed because of the failure to notify the parents, the appellate court
held that "'there is no constitutional requirement that [law enforcement officials] notify a juvenile's parent[] prior to questioning.' 31 9 And further, "'if
the juvenile indicates to [the] police that [the juvenile] does not [want] to
309. A.P., 958 So. 2d at 520 (citing Forsett, 790 So. 2d at 475); see also Larzelere v. State,
676 So. 2d 394, 403 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam); Thomas v. State, 785 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); Lee v. State, 690 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
310. A.P., 958 So. 2d at 521.
311. Id. (quoting Lee, 690 So. 2d at 668).
312. See, e.g., State v. Roman, 983 So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008); M.A.B.
v. State, 957 So. 2d 1219, 1219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc) (per curiam).
313. See, e.g., State v. S.V., 958 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
2003)).

See DALE Er AL., supra note 137, at 5-60.
958 So. 2d at 610.
Id.
Id. at611-12.
Id. at612.
Id. at 611 (quoting Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
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speak to them until he or she has had [a 3chance]
to speak [to his or her] par2
ents, [then] the questioning must cease." 1
A second recent appellate opinion involving an appeal from a denial of
a motion to suppress, based in part upon the lack of involvement of a sixteenyear-old defendant's mother, prior to a confession of participating in a robbery that resulted in the victim's death, is Harrisv. State.32' In that case, the
minor's "mother was home when the [police] arrived and was told that her
son was going to be taken to the police station for questioning about a recent
murder., 322 The mother did not indicate "she wanted to come to the station
or that she wanted an attorney for her son. 323 At no time did the juvenile
ever ask for his mother or an attorney to be present when he was questioned.324 On these grounds, and applying the generic totality
of the circums325
tances test to the confession, the appellate court upheld it.
In recent years most states, including Florida, have expanded the use of
the juvenile delinquency court as a means to deal with school-related issues. 326 For example, Florida provides that acts by juveniles which are "specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede . . .
progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on the school[]
property" constitutes an act of juvenile delinquency. 327 J.J.V. State321 is an
example of an appellate opinion dealing with school disruption by a student
that resulted in a delinquency charge.3 29 The underlying dispute which resulted in the delinquency charge was disruptive behavior by the youngster in
a school cafeteria during breakfast hours where the student "attempted 33to0
incite two female students to engage in an altercation in the cafeteria.
The school employee had to call the school dean and the school's resource
officer to control the youngster. 33' The appellate court affirmed, finding that

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
797 So.
328.
329.
330.
331.

S.V., 958 So. 2d at 611 (quoting Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004).
979 So. 2d 372, 373-74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 375.

Id.
See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 163, at 398.
J.J. v. State, 944 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting T.H. v. State,
2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 519.

Id.
Id. at 520.
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there was evidence to support the proposition that the youngster "intended to
disrupt school activities. 332
The school employee charged with monitoring the cafeteria testified that she asked J.J. to calm down and stop at least four or five
times, which he did not do. She believed J.J. was inciting the two
girls to fight, and he wanted to see them fight again like they did
on the bus the day before. As a result of J.J.'s behavior, the students in the cafeteria got louder and started to crowd around the
girls' table. She further testified that the incident interfered 333
with
the serving of breakfast and her normal duties in the cafeteria.
While the student's behavior was unacceptable and while the media is
full of reports about problems in the public school system, it remains to be
seen whether the use of the juvenile criminal justice system can assist in diminishing school disruption.
Two cases came before the Florida appellate courts during the most recent reported cycle, involving delinquency cases derived from school
searches.334 In R.B. v. State,335 a student charged with possession of cannabis
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency on the grounds that there was
no reasonable suspicion to justify the school search under the United States
Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 336 Under T.L.O., the test
for a warrantless search is reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.337
In the case at bar, the security officer monitoring the school security camera
had a previous encounter with the youngster being under the influence of
drugs at school, saw that the youngster with his hands cupped showing
another student something and then putting the object in his pocket, and
therefore brought both students to the school office where the officer removed the small bag of marijuana.338 The appellate court affirmed on these
facts.339

332. J.J., 944 So. 2d at 520. But see M.S.G., III v. State, 971 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam) (finding no evidence of "deliberate intent to disrupt a school
function").
333. J.J., 944 So. 2d at 520.
334. See R.B. v. State, 975 So. 2d 546, 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam);
D.G. v. State, 961 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
335. R.B., 975 So. 2d at 546.
336. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547.
337. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341; R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547 (citing D.G., 961 So. 2d at 1064).
338. R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547.
339. Id. at 548.
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D.G. v. State34° involved an eighth grader who appealed from a determination of delinquency based on possession of marijuana.3 4 ' Here the basis
for the school search was the statement of a student informant that the respondent "'may have been in possession of marijuana.' 342 The appellate
court held that information provided by an informant, who is known to the
investigator, is widely regarded as "reasonable suspicion necessary to meet
the constitutional test," 3 recognizing that other courts have similarly
found.34 The appellate court thus affirmed.345
VI.

THE RIGHTS OF UNWED BIOLOGICAL FATHERS

In 2003, the Florida Legislature dramatically changed Florida's Adoption Act by adding a putative father registry. 346 This statute provided that the
failure to register through the registry constituted a waiver of parental rights
for these unwed fathers when the biological mother sought to have the child
adopted.347 This statute, apparently aimed at expediting the adoption process,
was promulgated in the face of a series of United States Supreme Court opinions that provided protection to unwed fathers, including Stanley v. Illinois, 34 8 Quilloin v. Walcott,34 9 Caban v. Mohammed,350 and Lehr v. Robinson.3 5 1 In combination, these cases have held on the basis of the principles of
due process and equal protection that unwed fathers have a protected privacy
and liberty interest in their children so long as the father has evidenced some
form of involvement with the child.352 As the Court said in Lehr: "The biological connection between father and child is unique and worthy of constitutional protection if the father grasps the opportunity to develop that biologi-

340. 961 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
341. Id. at 1064.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1064-65 (citing Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2004); Roy v. Fulton
County Sch. Dist., F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d
1199 (Mass. 1990)).
345. D.G., 961 So. 2d at 1066.
346. See FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2003).
347. Id. § 63.054(1).
348. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
349. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
350. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
351. 463 U.S. 248 (1983); See FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2003).
352. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248-49; Caban,441 U.S. at 380-81; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at
246; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

cal connection into a full and enduring relationship., 353 In Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 3 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an adoption
agency must serve the unmarried, biological father "known or identified by
the mother as a potential father and who" may be located, through reasonable
efforts, "with a notice of the intended adoption plan. ' 355 He should further be
advised "that he has thirty days in which to file a claim of paternity with the
Florida Putative Father Registry and to file an affidavit of commitment
'
[with] the court." 356
In so doing, the court recognized that Florida Statutes,
as a matter of statutory construction, should be read to provide for notice.357
The Supreme Court of Florida chose not to reach the constitutional question,
either on the basis of the Florida Constitution or the Federal Constitution, of
whether the notice requirement violated due process and privacy rights set
forth in the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as in the
Florida Constitutional jurisprudence.3 58
The Florida statutory scheme for adoption contains other possible shortcomings, such as the elimination of fraud as a defense for failure to register,
statutory construction, which may deny a putative father the ability to grasp
an opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child, and a standard of care, which places the burden of proving financial and other capacity
on the putative father. 359 The constitutional infirmities in the Florida statute
were described in some detail in the concurring opinion in J.A. by Chief Justice Lewis. 36
VII.

OTHER MATTERS

Over thirty years ago in Goss v. Lopez,361 the United States Supreme
Court held that a "10 day suspension from school is not de minimus" and
may not be imposed without complete disregard of due process rights. 362 In

353. Steven A. v. Rickie M., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); see also Lehr,
463 U.S. at 262.
354. 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
355. Id. at 202.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 203.
358. See id. at 206 (Lewis, J., concurring) (citing N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 634 (Fla. 2003); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275
(Fla. 1996); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).

359.

See FLA.

360.
361.
362.

See J.A., 963 So. 2d at 203-10 (Lewis, J., concurring).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 576.

STAT.

§ 63.063 (2008).
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Rigau v. District School Board of Pasco County,363 the appellate court heard

a pro se appeal by an attorney father of a student who had been suspended
from school for ten days for being under the influence of alcohol at a schoolrelated event, the Grad Bash Universal Studios-Orlando." Significantly, the
board failed to appear at the appeal or respond in any way. 365 The appellate
court held that there was no evidence that the student had been under the
influence. 366 "Rather, the school board found that the... [youngster] was in
close proximity to ...alcohol throughout the evening., 367 There being no
evidence at all of the intoxication, indeed he was admitted to Universal Studios after the police officer conducted a field sobriety test, the appellate court
reversed the youngster's suspension.36 8 Significantly, the appellate court
noted that the child's father was an attorney and that less fortunate students
would not be able to appeal the board's suspension, which was not supported
by any competent evidence and, that such a suspension, would cause serious
damage to the students.369 On the other hand, in D.K v. District School
Board Indian River County, 370 the school board sought dismissal of an "appeal on the grounds that a suspension order is not permitted to be reviewed
under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act.",37' The appellate court
granted the motion finding that "hearings that result in expulsion fall within
the [Administrative Procedure Act] and are entitled to judicial review," but
that "suspension hearings are specifically exempted from the protections" of
the Administrative Procedure Act.372 However, the court noted in a footnote
that its ruling did "not bar [a] student who has a constitutional right violated
by a suspension from bringing action in the appropriate court. 3 73 It simply
held that the child did not allege any due process or other constitutional violation.374
Children who are in the care of the Department of Children and Families sometimes are recipients of funds from government agencies such as the
Social Security Administration. 37 When that happens, the amounts are
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

961 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 383.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Rigau, 961 So. 2d at 383-84.
Id. at 384.
981 So. 2d 667 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id.at 668 n.1.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 402.17 (2008).
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placed into a master trust fund by DCF for the benefit of the child.376 The
question before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Children
& Families v. R.G., was whether DCF should distribute the money in the
account directly to the juvenile upon his eighteenth birthday or send the
money back to the government agency, in the case at bar to the Social Security Administration, and "the Social Security Administration would later
disburse the funds to" the child.3 78 DCF appealed from a trial court order
requiring it to provide the funds directly to the child.3 7 9 At the trial level,
DCF could cite no legal authority in support of its position, despite the fact
that it was offered the opportunity to "file a motion for rehearing to provide
the trial court with any federal authority" in support of its position. 3' 0 The
" ' On appeal, the Fifth District rejected
State filed no motion for rehearing.38
all of the State's arguments, finding the claim under Florida law was
preempted by the federal Supremacy Clause, and finding the State's interpretation of the federal statute on point "tortured., 382 Finding no support for the
State's position, the appellate court affirmed the proposition that the funds go
to the child upon reaching his or her eighteenth birthday.383
Proceedings pursuant to Florida's Domestic Violence statute may involve minors. In Moore v. Pattin,384 a mother filed a petition "for an injunction for protection against domestic violence" on behalf of the parties' tenyear-old daughter.385 The mother alleged that while she was at work, "the
father beat ...the dog, threw pots and pans, ordered [the child] to remove all
her clothing, and beat her with a belt and a shoe., 386 The appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling, finding first that the Florida Domestic Violence
Statute provides for injunctions of the nature sought.387 It found further that,
pursuant to chapter thirty-nine, the test "is whether the discipline imposed..
. is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury and thus constitute[s] excessively harsh corporal discipline., 388 Applying the standard, the

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

See id.
950 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 499.
R.G., 950 So. 2d at 499-500.
Id. at 500--01.
983 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 665.

20091

2007-2008 SURVEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW

court held that for purposes of the domestic violence injunction, the corporal
punishment was excessive and the injunction should stand.389
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the survey year, the intermediate appellate courts decided a substantial series of cases involving important statutory claims. In particular,
the courts provided substantial guidance in the area of domestic violence and
its application in dependency proceedings that should help the practitioner
representing all parties in juvenile court.

389.

Moore, 983 So. 2d at 665.

